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ORGANIZING FOR RESULTS:
THE PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR "
Cristina C. David, Eliseo R. Ponce, and Ponciano S. Intal, Jr. ""
Introduction
Philippine agriculture performed poorly in the 1980s. The average annual growth rate
declined from 4.8 percent in the 1970s to 2.1 percent, lower than the population growth rate.
As a result, export surpluses dwindled and agricultural imports rose. Although depressed world
commodity markets undoubtedly lowered agriculture's growth performance, other Asian
countries managed to grow faster, and most of them at a rate even higher than in the 1970s
(Table 1). The country's poor performance can be largely attributed to the slow growth of crop
productivity, eroding Philippine competitive advantage (Fig. la). Among the traditional
commodities, only yields of rice and, to a lesser extent, corn grew significantly. As Philippine
coconut and sugar yields stagnated, Malaysian oil palm and Thai sugar expanded their shares
of world markets. (Fig. lb).
With the closing of the land frontier and continued high population growth, agricultural
development will have to come from technological change and irrigation expansion that can
increase productivity and effective crop area. Yet government interventions in agriculture over
the past four decades have relied primarily on short-term price and trade regulations to lower
food prices, raise farmers' income, and achieve food self-sufficiency; regulations are easier to
implement, have short-term impact, and generate resources for the agency concerned. Market
regulations, however, have often protected consumers at the expense of farmers, raised
production costs, distorted incentives against commodities where our comparative advantage
lies,and misallocated government resources from growth-enhancing investments to unproductive
bureaucratic costs without achieving their stated objectives. On the other hand, too few resources
have been allocated to the more cost-effective, sustainable long-term policy instruments that raise
agricultural productivity and lower unit cost of production, such as agricultural research and
irrigation, to attain these conflicting objectives.
"Preparedfor the "Crisisof Poverty," a setof studiesunderthe Micro-Impactof MacroeconomicAdjustment
Policies(MIMAP)Projectfinancedby the InternationalDevelopmentResearchCenter(IDRC).
**ResearchFellow,PIDS;Director,ResearchandExtensionat VisayasStateCollegeof Agriculture(VISCA);
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2Table i. Average annual growth rates (%) of agricultural
gross value added at constant prices for
selected Asian countries
1970-1980 1980-1990
Bangladesh 1.8 2.9
India i.i 3.4
Indonesia 1.3 5.3
Malaysia 3.8 3.8
Philippines 4.8 2.1
Thailand 4.9 2.5
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Figure 1b
Trends in Yield of 4 Major Crops in
Selected Asian Countries
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This paper proposes a set of policy and institutional reforms to reverse the weak
performance of agriculture in the 1980s. Our reform proposals focus on three aspects: (1)
completing the deregulation of the sector; (2) improving the allocation of public funds across
policy instruments; and (3) restructuring the agricultural bureaucracy. These agricultural reforms
will lay the foundation for an efficient incentive structure and institutional structure of
support-service delivery, leading to rapid and sustained long-term growth.
Our reform proposals are intertwined and self-reinforcing. The further deregulation of
the sector forces the agricultural bureaucracy to focus its talents and energies on the provision
and/or encouragement of productivity-enhancing services to agriculture, allows the
organizational streamlining and institutional restructuring of the agricultural bureaucracy, and
releases scarce resources for productive investments in agriculture. The end result is greater
effectiveness of government expenditures and an agricultural bureaucracy better organized for
"results" in the agricultural sector.
Deregulation
Many well-meaning government interventions in the agriculture sector use up scarce
resources with almost no tangible positive impact; rather, they impose heavy and unnecessary
transactions costs and uncertainty on farmers, and distort agricultural production and the
marketing systems. For example, National Food Authority (NFA) has spent billions of pesos
over the years in rice purchases without successfully stabilizing rice prices or raising farm prices
to NFA support prices (Table 2). Similarly, despite NFA's monopoly control of corn imports,
the average implicit tariff rate on corn imports is below the 50-percent book tariff rate (Table
3). Had importation of corn been open to any private trader without NFA control, domestic corn
prices would have been 50 percent higher than imported corn and the government would have
earned corresponding customs duties rather than spend scarce public resources. The import
regulations on seeds raises costs of production to farmers and prices to consumers, particularly
for vegetables.
Deregulation is an important means of improving the effectiveness of government
agricultural administration by eliminating or streamlining unnecessary, distortionary, and unduly
expensive administrative tasks. Deregulation can become a means of "people empowerment" and
improving incentives for agricultural production and productivity.
The Aquino administration started deregulation in agriculture by dismantling a number
of counterproductive regulations and monopolies: export taxes on selected agricultural
commodities, copra export ban, sugar and coconut monopolies, quantitative controls on fertilizer
imports, and the NFA monopoly on imports of wheat and animal feeds. It is high time to
complete deregulation by abolishing more counterproductive interventions and by modifying
regulations that should be retained. Deregulation need not be undertaken as part of the
6Table 2. Comparison of government support to farm price of paddy and
ceiling to retail price of rice, 1960-1991.
Support/ ceiling/ Retail/ Ceiling/
Farm price Retail price Farm price Support price
1960-64 0.94 0.74 2.04 1.59
1965-69 1.09 0.76 2.21 1.53
1970-74 0.94 0.81 2.04 1.78
1975-79 1.13 1.00 2.15 1.90
1980-84 1.22 1.0.2 2.15 1.81
1985-89 1.16 0.91 2.11 1.66
1990-91 1.23 - 2.18 -
7Table 3. Trends in nominal protection rate of rice and
corn, 1960-91, (%).
Rice Corn
1960-64 43 -43
1965-69 Ii 3
1970-74 4 9
1975-79 -13 22
1980-84 -13 ii
1985-89 16 48
1990-91 16 -
Note: Nominal protection rate is the % difference
between domestic and border price. Domestic
price is wholesale price of rice and corn
(yellow). Border price is CIF import unit value
for corn and Thai 35% brokens plus 15% to arrive
at landed cost for rice.
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8bargaining process, and industry over the pace of trade liberalization; rather, it should be
undertaken because it improves the efficiency and efficacy of government support to agriculture.
To complete deregulation of agriculture, the following should be abolished:
* NFA monopoly on international trade and domestic market operations in
rice and corn;
* hectarage limits on banana production;
* import bans on garlic, onions, potatoes, cabbage, coffee, and seeds;
* import controls on sugar;
* quantitative import controls on cattle feeder stock;
* export bans on buntal and ramie planting materials;
* slaughter ban on carabaos;
* export restrictions on animal and animal products;
* licensing/registration of rice retail trade and warehousing, sugar trade,
coconut-industry participants, fiber traders, processors, manufacturers, livestock
and poultry traders, livestock auction markets, feed establishments, fertilizer
warehouses.
The fear that abolishing the NFA trade monopoly and domestic market operations in rice
and corn will remove government subsidies to farmers and consumers and leave the market
vulnerable to price manipulation is unfounded. Allowing private imports will increase
competition among rice traders. Because domestic prices can be influenced indirectly by tariff
policies, budgetary allocations to NFA simply subsidize inherently inefficient government
market operations. In other words, subsidies to NFA largely benefit the bureaucracy rather than
the target beneficiaries. Special targeted food-subsidy programs --in thecase of calamities, for
example -- can be more economically accomplished by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD).
High protection of corn means high input costs for the livestock industry, resulting in
high prices of meat products and an internationally uncompetitive domestic livestock (and corn)
industry. This implies that encouraging domestic corn production with high tariff protection is
not a socially optimal strategy. The best strategy would be to raise farm productivity, allowing
higher farm profits, lower corn and meat prices, and eventual corn and livestock export
competitiveness. Yet the recent budget for corn research averaged only P10 to P15 million,
much lower than the P18 to P20 million research budget for tobacco which contributes less value
added to the economy than corn.
in the long run, quantitative import controls must be replaced by tariffs equivalent to 20
to 30 percent. However, tax-free importations of agricultural commodities -- such as possible
for cooperatives that have tax-free privileges for importing raw materials and capital equipment
-- must not be allowed. In selected cases, these tariffs may initially be higher (40 to 50 percent)
during a two- to three-year adjustment period. Higher tariffs, as with import bans, will only
9promote inefficient production. It should be emphasized that import controls or high tariffs on
agricultural commodities do not generally help the poor, particularly in the case of the sugar
sector which is dominated by large landholdings and has historically benefited from the United
States premium-sugar market. The poor are the landless, including the sugar workers, who have
to pay for the policy-induced higher prices.
For rice and other commodities that have widely fluctuating world prices, a variable
tariff scheme may be adopted to protect the domestic market from secular world-price
instabilities. Because the world market is less subject to seasonal price variation, international
trading by the private sector, in addition to private storage, will help stabilize domestic supply
and price seasonally, minimizing seasonal domestic price fluctuations in a more cost-effective
manner than direct government marketing operations. Varying tariffs seasonally is unnecessary
and distortionary for products that are not highly perishable (e.g., corn). Administratively, a
variable tariff scheme can be implemented by setting a reasonable tariff range per commodity
(agreed upon with Congress) and a set of clear criteria and rules allowing automatic tariff
adjustments within the tariff range.
Hectarage limits, export restrictions, and slaughter bans on carabaos are clearly counter
to the objective of higher agricultural growth. On the other hand, special licensing/registration
requirements for certain agricultural products/inputs do raise cost of production and promote
graft and corruption. In most cases, these requirements were instituted to collect information
that could be obtained in a more cost- effective manner. If these were required to strengthen
controls, revoking ordinary business permits rather than special licences for violations of trade
regulations would have been a more severe penalty.
A number of regulatory functions that raise overall efficiency of the sector, extract
monopoly rents for public gain, and protect human health and the environment should be
continued with some modifications in procedures.
* Shares in export premium markets in sugar (US), fresh coconuts (Taiwan), and
coffee, as well as permits to establish and operate fishponds, fishpens, and commercial fishing
vessels, must be distributed either through open bidding or by imposing fees that reflect their
true long-term scarcity value. This is based on the principle that benefits from natural resources
and external policies must be shared with the general public. Although fishing permits will have
to be issued by the local government, the central government must continue to coordinate the
setting of fees or bidding procedures to ensure correct and consistent pricing. Proceeds should
then be shared between local and central government to motivate local governments to manage
their natural resources efficiently and share the benefits of abundant natural resources with the
rest of the population.
* Certification for quality standards of seeds, fiber, tobacco, feeds, coconuts,
fertilizers, and others, is a public service that should continue to be provided for a fee that
covers variable cost, but availed of on a voluntary basis.
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* Export restrictions on endangered species or raw materials on which the country
has some degree of monopoly control in the world market should be maintained.
* Quarantine service, meat inspection, pesticide regulations and monitoring, which
have health, safety, and environmental benefits, must be strengthened.
Strengthening Support Services
Although the public sector should largely leave domestic and international marketing of
agricultural commodities to the private sector, the government should strengthen its support
services. Support services are aimed at increasing productivity (agricultural research, extension,
irrigation), enhancing market efficiency (market-promotion policy and development, agricultural
statistics), and efficient, sustainable management of natural resources and the environment
(proper pricing and other regulations).
Most support services cannot be devolved to the private sector because of their
public-good nature, pervasive externalities, and large investments. For example, the private
sectdr will underinvest in the development of agricultural technologies; it will invest only in
technologies that can be embodied in purchased inputs and/or where ownership of the new
technology can be effectively protected by patents, such as hybrid seeds, farm machineries,
pesticides, and fertilizers. It will not invest in a wide range of biological technologies --
high-yielding cultivars, improved farm management, integrated pest management -- where their
use cannot be effectively limited to those who pay for them. Moreover, agricultural technologies
are highly location-specific; relatively little can be directly borrowed from abroad without some
measure of testing and adaptation.
The public sector will also have to play a major role in irrigation investments because
of their large size, long gestation period, and complementarities with power and road
infrastructure. Forestry and fishery resources, which have pervasive externalities, must likewise
be publicly managed to ensure long-term sustainability of their production and minimize
negative intertemporal and interregional effects on agricultural productivity.
Strengthening agricultural support services will require raising budgetary support for
agriculture, improving budgetary allocation within agriculture, and restructuring the agricultural
bureaucracy.
Raising and Improving Budgetary Allocation
The agricultural sector bore the brunt of the contractionary policies in the early 1980s.
Relative to gross value-added in agriculture and to total government expenditures, public
expenditures for agriculture in the mid-1980s were only about equal to 1955 levels (Fig. 2).
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Figure 2
Public Expenditures in Agriculture (Ga) as Percent of
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While expenditures for agriculture recovered by the late 1980s, the Philippines continued to
have the lowest ratio of public expenditure for agriculture to total public expenditures and gross
domestic product among ASEAN countries (David 1991).
It should also be noted that the increases in public expenditures in the late 1980s went
mostly to agrarian reform, environmental protection, price support, and other support services
rather than to growth-enhancing investments such as agricultural research, and irrigation (Fig.
3). Although most of the agrarian-reform expenditures were for support services such as
extension, the linkage to land reform rather than to technological opportunities reduced
cost-effectiveness of such expenditures.
In the 1960s, the country's ratio of expenditure for agricultural research to gross
value-added in agriculture was about average among developing countries; it is now the lowest
among major Asian countries (Fig. 4). The relatively weak support to agricultural research
explains the decline in the competitive advantage of Philippine agriculture, particularly for
traditional crops. The generally high estimated rates of returns of agricultural research reported
worldwide and in the Philippines clearly indicate that the country is underinvesting in the
development of agricultural technologies (Table 4). Those rates of returns, even if discounted
by half, are higher than estimates for infrastructure investments, which typically range from 15
to 25 percent. Therefore, raising public investments for agricultural research must receive
equally high priority as public infrastructure. Limiting the regulatory functions in agriculture as
recommended above will free significant resources for growth-enhancing investments, as the
NFA budget alone is about three to four times the total public support for agricultural research.
Restructuring the Bureaucracy
Efficient delivery of agricultural support services has been greatly slowed by weaknesses
in the institutional structure of governance. Whereas the Department of Agriculture (DA)
assumes the responsibility for accelerating agricultural development, the mandates, authorities,
and budgets for performing the various agriculture-related activities are spread over several
different agencies belonging to at least four other departments. Further, the key instruments for
raising agricultural productivity -- technological change and irrigation investments -- are largely
outside the purview of the DA.
The mandates for technology generation in agriculture, fisheries, and natural resources
still officially belong to the Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural Resources
Research Development (PCARRD) and Philippine Council for Agriculture and Marine Research
and Development (PCAMRD) under the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).
Irrigation development belongs to National Irrigation Authority (NIA) as an attached agency of
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) allocates nearly 90 percent of agrarian reform funds and manpower resources for
13
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Table 4. Summary of rates of returns estimates
of public agricultural research
Percent
Developing Countries (Evenson and Davld, 1992)
5 studies 0
8 studies 0 - 20
28 studies 30 - 50
37 studies 50+
Philipplnes
Rice (Flores, Evenson, & Hayami, 1978) 75
Corn (Librero and Perez, 1987) 29 - 48
Sugar (Librero, Perez, and Emlano, 1987) 51 - 71
Poultry (Librero and Emlano, 1990) i00+
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provision of agricultural support services. The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) also similarly delivers agricultural support services in the upland areas.
The problem stems not only from the dispersion of responsibilities across several
departments but, equally important, from the defects in the organizational structure of the DA.
Although the Aquino administration brought most of the autonomous agriculture-related
agencies -- NFA, Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA)
-- under the DA, they have remained largely intact as attached agencies. Thus, the
organizational structure adopted after 1986 is a mixture of attached commodity agencies and a
set of bureaus, councils, and offices concerned with other commodity groups and functions
outside the purview of attached agencies (Charts la and lb).
Attached commodity agencies may have solely research functions (Philrice, Naphire,
etc.), regulatory functions (NFA, Fertilizer and Pesticides Authority, etc.), or the whole range
of research, extension, marketing, and regulatory functions (PCA, SRA, Fiber Industry
Development Authority, National Tobacco Administration). Bureaus and other offices similarly
perform a single or variety of functions. For regional operations, the attached agencies are
separate and independent of the integrated operations of the regional offices of the DA. As a
result, there is considerable overlapping of functions and activities, particularly in relation to
extension. On the other hand, the essential interactions among the various support services
throughout the whole process, from planning to delivery, such as between research and
extension, is largely missing.
T.he commodity-based structure of the DA not only exacerbates the fragmentation of the
bureaucracy and the overlapping of functions, it also makes the department prone to greater
instability and inflexibility. Historically, the DA has been divided among more and more
specific commodities, based mainly on political-economy factors rather than consistent, sound,
and logical criteria. Why, for example, is there a commodity agency for fiber or cotton but
not for corn? In the 1970s, several DA agencies became autonomous, severely weakening
controls and accountability in their bureaucracies and constraining coordination of research and
extension within the DA.
The commodity-based structure favors regulations against growth-enhancing activities
-- research, extension, irrigation -- which have longer-term pay-off. Regulations are easy to
implement, have short-term impacts, generate resources for the agency and rents for the
employees allocating import/export permits, issuing licenses, and so forth. In contrast, wen-
documented justifications and a record of performance are necessary to raise budgetary
resources for productivity-enhancing activities. Furthermore, heads of commodity agencies are
typically nontechnical persons who may not fully appreciate the potential contributions of
technological change or the scientific skills and different type of management style required for
productive research. The multi-functional commodity-based organizational structure has
inadvertently lowered the priority of productivity-enhancing activities.
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Research and Extension -.
The weakness of the overall organizational structure for agricultural governance has
adversely affected the support, efficiency, and effectiveness of the research and extension
system, fragmenting it and leading to the following problems.
* Extremely weak linkage between research and extension arising from the
separation of the mandates between the DOST and DA. The designation of the Secretary of
Agriculture as Vice-Chairman of PCARRD and PCAMRD is not a sufficient mechanism of
linkage, because the necessary interaction is not merely at a policy level, but at a
working--scientific and grass-roots-- level. Effective linkage requires that both research and
extension be accountable to the same office.
* Unbalanced allocations between research and extension, across commodity
groups, and across agencies. While the Philippines has one of the lowest expenditures for
research relative to gross value-added in agriculture in Asia, a recent study (PAES 1991)
indicates that the extension budget and manpower resources are among the biggest among
developing countries. This suggests that the country's budget allocation for technological
development is biased against research in favor of extension. Such imbalance may be explained
by the widespread belief that there are a substantial number of mature technologies on the shelf
(developed locally or to be borrowed abroad) and it is the weak and underfunded extension
system that is a constraint. Thus, budgets for extension activities continue to grow and wasteful
duplication of efforts persist. The extension forces for sugar, coconut, tobacco, fiber, cotton,
and other commodities are separately administered by the different units of the DA, not to
mention the extension force of the DENR in the uplands, NIA in irrigated rice, DAR in agrarian
reform areas, and DOST's efforts to coordinate the dissemination of "trichoderma." Yet within
a single region, even within a single farm, a whole range of crops will be grown and
intercropped or planted in rotation. This clearly indicates that consolidation of efforts could
save resources, which is all the more imperative to efficiently carry out the decentralization of
the delivery of basic support services under the Local Government Code.
The scientific community itself promotes and reinforces the idea of having many available
new appropriate or mature technologies and a weak extension system, as research performance
is evaluated in terms of studies completed or new varieties released, rather than rates of
technology adoption, in fact, there are too many extension agents but too few appropriate
technologies to extend. When a new technology is clearly profitable, as it is with modern rice
varieties or chemical spraying of mangoes, it does not take too many resources to have it widely
adopted. Studies completed and new varieties released do not constitute mature technologies
unless proven to be adopted. It is only through a strong working linkage between research and
extension that the pace of technology generation and adoption can be greatly accelerated because
it will bring scientists closer to farmers.
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Within the research system, imbalances in the allocation of research funds and manpower
resources significantly lower the productivity of the research system. Limited research funds
are allocated thinly to too many commodities. Moreover, as Table 5 indicates, the allocation
across crops is incongruent with their economic importance: more resources are allocated to
minor crops, and too few on major crops. The research-priority ranking of commodities
according to degree of economic importance generally conforms to measures of rates of return
to research, as the benefits to research are higher, the greater the value of production, while
the cost of producing new technologies across commodities may not differ as widely as gross
value added.
The distribution of public funds and manpower resources between the DA and
PCARRD/PCAMRD/SCUs is imbalanced, particularly in light of distribution of responsibilities
in research implementation and overall accountability. The establishment of PCAR in 1972 "to
establish, support, and manage the operations of a national network of research centers/programs
in agriculture and natural resources" also involved the policy decision to shift the major task
of technology development to the state colleges and universities. While the DANR received
17 percent and the SCUs 23 percent of public resources for research in the early 1970s, the
MAF had 23 percent and SCUs 49 percent by 1.985 (ISNAR 1988). In addition, most of the
research investments funded by external sources (e.g., USAID and World Bank) during this
period were made in the university sector. As a result, the research capability of the DA
declined as reflected in its scientific manpower resources relative to the SCUs, which increased
significantly (Table 6).
The 1990 distribution of public research allocation indicates a higher research budget
for the DA compared to PCARRD and the SCUs (Table 7) due mainly to the establishment of
the Philippine Rice Research Institute (Philrice) and strengthening of the DA's research
capabilities, as recommended by an ISNAR review mission (1988). Allocations of external
grants to the SCUs/PCARRD/PCAMRD group, however, remain substantial, possibly still
more than the total research budget of the DA.
Despite the dramatic turnaround in the DA's agricultural research resources, the
scientific manpower resources in agriculture are still overwhelmingly located in the universities.
Assuming that only 30 percent of Ph.D. man-years in the SCUs were devoted to agricultural
research, this would still be equivalent to three or four times that of the DA.
PCARRD supposedly leads in planning, prioritizing, and coordinating the agricultural
research program of the country. However, not only was the planning process faulty, PCARRD
does not have effective control over the research budgets of state colleges and universities or
DA research units. Although PCARRD's endorsement of agricultural research budget request
is required for DBM's approval, it has become a mere pro forma process as SCUs and DA
directly defend their research budgets to DBM. PCARRD does not have sufficient clout to argue
for higher research budgets and its competitive research grant is too small to influence research
thrusts significantly. The establishment of regional research consortia to strengthen PCARRD's
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Table 5. Estimated research expenditures and gross value
added of selected crops, 1990.
Research GVA Research/GVA
(P million) (P million) (%)
a
Rice 50.2 36416 0.14
b
Corn 15.0 16469 0.09
a
Coconut 54 8 12515 0 44• •
a
Sugar 39.8 6962 0.57 .....
a
Tobacco 18.0 2646 0.68
a/
Based on GOP budgets of Philrice, PCA, SRA, and NTA.
b/
Estimated research budget for corn (including extenal
grants) in USM, IPB, and Ilagan Experiment Station.
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Table 6. Number of PhD and MS holders in the agencies
conducting/coordinating agricultural research
PhD MS
1970 1977 1986 1991 1970 1977 1986 1991
DA 3 4 Ii 60 51 39 138 313
SCU's/PCARRD/PCAMRD 143 195 588 292 428 990
UPLB 252 190
VISCA . 69 124
CMU 42 108
UEP 5 5
Sources of data: 1970, 1977 ISNAR
1986 PCARRD
1991 Specific Agencies
23
Table 7. Distribution of research budgets
by agency, 1990 (_ million)
a DOST - SCU
Department of Agriculture
a b
b
BAR 7.7 PCARRD 62.9 130.2
REG'L OFFICE 85.3 PCAMRD 9.4 9.4
b
PHILRICE 50.2 UPLB 143.8 149.1
b
PCA 54.8 VISCA 19.9 30.6
SRA 39.8 CLSU 6.9 6.9
b
BPI 22.9 USM 5.7 10.2
NTA 18.0 MMSU 5.0 5.0
BAI 8.5 CRDI 6.7 6.7
BFAR 5.7 BSU 4.7 4.7
BSWM 6.5 ISU 2.2 2.2
NAPHIRE 5.0 CSU 2.2 2.2
CSAC 2.0 2.0
PAC i.3 1.3
CMU 1.3 1.3
Total _ 304.4 _ 274.0 _ 361.8
Includes only government funds.
b
Includes government funds and external grants
for selected institutions.
Sources of data: Bureau of Agricultural Research
Government Appropriation Act
Individual Agencies
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coordination cannot make the research system more efficient because budgetary and management
controls are not unified, there is no economicframework inresearch prioritization, and the weak
•linkage between research and extension is not addressed. Moreover, DOST's move to undertake
technology-transfer activities introduces further inefficiencies by duplicating the DA's function
and by increasing transaction costs.
The aboveproblems persist because the overall organizational structure obscures
accountability. The Secretary of Agriculture is ultimately responsible for the performance of
the sector, yet he does not control the key instruments for agricultural productivity -- agricultural
research and irrigation development. The research community blames slow technological
progress on the weakness of the extension system, not realizing that the weakness stems from
the lack of profitable new technologies to extend and the consequent focus on delivering
subsidized inputs and credit. Since neither the DOST nor the SCUs are held accountable for
agricultural development and are independent of the DA, there is no effective pressure on the
research system in general to improve its performance through more efficient allocation of
resources. Even within the DA, the multi-functional commodity-based structure and autonomy
of several major commodity agencies make it extremely difficult to effectively manage and
monitor performance of the research units under its umbrella.
Reorganizing Agricultural Bureaucracy: A Proposal
Because the underlying institutional problemis structural, restructuring the organizational
framework for the delivery of agricultural support services is necessary to increase efficiency.
It is time for change not only because there is a new administration, but because the
implementation of the Local Government Code makes restructuring imperative. The central
government must reorganize to efficiently develop the services that provincial governments must
deliver.
Principles and.Results
In developing the proposed organizationalstructure, we followed a numberof principles.
* Limit public involvement to the following:
- Delivery of basic services that have public-good attributes and externalities such
as research, extension, and irrigation;
- Allocation of fishery resources, and export premium markets (US sugar quota,
coffee, etc.);
- Market promotion, development, information collection, analysis, and analysis,
and dissemination;
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- Regulations necessary for the protection of human health and the environment
to ensure long-term sustainability of agricultural production;
- Devolve extension, irrigation management,and certain regulations to provincial
government;
- Integrate responsibility of all public functions related to agriculture under the
DA, except for redistribution of land (DAR) and management of forestry
and mineral resources (DENR);
- Reorganize a consolidated, but greatly trimmed DA along a functional rather
than a commodity-based structure.
Greater overall efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability are expected because such
a structure will:
* minimize duplication of functions,
* minimize need for outside coordination,
* simplify lines of responsibility, authority, and accountability,
* clarify indices of performance,
* remove unnecessary and counter productive regulations and minimize
incentives to create new ones,
* strengthen linkages among research, extension, irrigation, and other
productivity-enhancing activities, and
* free resources available for efficient delivery of growth enhancing support
services.
Proposed Institutional Structure
Charts 2a-d and 3 present both the "ideal" organizational structure and the transitional
organizational structure of the DA. The "ideal" structure assumes that the legal mandate on the
ceilings on the number of undersecretaries and assistant secretaries are revised. The transition
structure takes as given the current stipulation of three each at most for undersecretary and
assistant secretary positions in the DA. In both "ideal" and transition structures, we attempt to
hew the organizational structure according to functions broadly defined: production support
services (research and development, irrigation, regional operations) and planning, policy, and
other support services (planning, policy and external affairs, marketing and inspection service).
The new structure proposes that irrigation, technology generation, and technology
transfer to the provincial governments be the responsibility of the DA under the overall
leadership of an assistant or even an undersecretary. This wih involve the transfer of the
mandate and the corresponding resources for irrigation from DPWH and applied agricultural
research from the DOST to the DA, and the separation of research and extension from the
marketing and regulatory functions in the attached agencies. Such a structure facilitates the
crucial linkage among production-related support services, especially between research and
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extension, and eases the rationalization of both financial and manpower resources of the
research system along economic importance of commodities/problem areas.
The SCUs will remain a major sector in applied agricultural research and extension, but
the DA shall assume control over government appropriations and general direction and priorities
for applied agriculture research and extension activities of SCUs. However, the general
administration and supervision, including appointments, salaries, and business operations, must
remain with the SCUs. A council-type of structure can manage the applied-research and
development system, but must be under the DA. The mandate to promote basic research in
agriculture should continue to be with the DOST.
Such an organizational structure for agricultural research and extension will be similar
to that of other countries -- such as Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, the European Community --
where ministries of agriculture are directly responsible for and conduct most agricultural
research. In the US, the land-grant universities are directly responsible for research and
extension to the state legislature, but the US Department of Agriculture maintains substantial
influence through a system of counterpart funding and its own administered research programs
and institutions. The Indian research system is also university-based but managed by a semi-
autonomous council (ICAR) responsible to the Ministry of Agriculture. PCARRD as originally
conceived and established was attached to the DANR; it was transfered to DOST only because
the DANR split into the DA and DNR in 1976.
The International Service for National Agricultural Research review (ISNAR 1988) stated
that "it would seem more logical that the universities and the colleges of agriculture should be
moving more and more into areas of strategic research, while a large part of applied research
for technology generation would become the responsibility of the DA research service and
commodity institutes." Given the concentration of scientific manpower in the SCUs at present,
a major part of the applied agricultural research will have to be performed by SCUs in the short
and medium term, but the general direction and priorities should be under the overall control
of the DA.
Interactions between basic and applied agricultural research can be fostered by
professional organizations with financial support both from DA and DOST. On the other hand,
the DA not only will have greater clout in raising public expenditures for agriculture, but will
be able to reallocate existing resources in favor of agricultural research over extension and other
market and regulatory functions. Overall, therefore, such a restructuring will be expected not
only to raise efficiency and effectiveness of the research and extension system through better
prioritization, stronger linkage of research and extension, and greater accountability, but also
to raise the public-expenditure budgets for agricultural research.
In the proposed organizational structure, there will be greater synergy in the functions
and activities of planning, policy, and other support services. Bringing both market development
and regulatory functions under one assistant secretary will encourage more enlightened and
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market-friendly regulations. Similarly, putting together planning, policy, and external affairs
functions under one assistant secretary will strengthen the DA's public-advocacy functions and
strategic planning. The DA will also step up the coUection and analysis of relevant agricultural
statistics in the regions, thereby supporting the regional operations group.
Concluding Remarks
The proposed policy and institutional reforms are bold and far-reaching. The details of
restructuring the agricultural bureaucracy will have to be worked out, modifications made, and
other issues, such as incentive structure, considered. New legislations must abolish many of the
regulatory functions, recast semi-autonomous agencies, and redistribute functions and resources
among departments. However, we are convinced of the validity of the underlying principles
behind the proposed reforms.
The previous administration took the first step toward organizational reform by bringing
many agriculture-related agencies -- NFA, PCA, etc. -- under the DA. DPWH recently agreed
to shift NIA to the DA. Steps have been taken to remove the autonomy of certain government
agencies -- such as the PCA -- to allow the DA's reorganization along functional rather than
commodity lines. Nevertheless, there will be great resistance to completing the process of
restructuring because of the following:
* political power of autonomous agencies such as PCA will be reduced;
* independence of PCARRD and SCUs with respect to agricultural research and
extension will be diminished;
* budgets and manpower resources for regulatory functions will be trimmed; and
* rent-seeking will be greatly minimized.
The proposed changes, however, will not need additional resources for the sector.
Indeed, the short-run savings can pay for the early retirement of redundant employees; long-run
savings will meet the increased need for agricultural research and infrastructure. What is
required is a strong political will and an active information campaign to muster the political
support for the changes.
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